Roundtable I Discussion: Advancements/Progress and Update from Last Year

Conclusions from last year's meeting:

- Bioterrorism risk received different levels of attention and a range of importance compared to other priorities.
- All of the nations seemed to initiate execution of their assessments by constructing and discussing scenarios.
- For the most part, risk seemed to be fairly consistently defined.
- Of the approaches presented, most of them were multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) approaches.
- More comfort and experience addressing the "consequence" side of the risk equation that the "likelihood" side.
- Little efforts focused on quantifying likelihood or probability explicitly. This is identified as the hardest part of risk assessment.
- There are similarities and differences in decision making environments in different nations with respect to how risk assessments are received, interpreted, and used.

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Recommendations from last year's meeting:

- There is a need for a variety of tools and resources to facilitate terrorism-based risk assessments
  - Tools and resources should be developed and distributed to the international community
  - Important to create a common international language and understanding of basic bioterrorism risk assessment concepts

- Similarly, risk assessment methodologies and results should be shared
  - The types of information requested most often included scenarios types and results, gaps and uncertainty results, risk communication, and risk management practices

Items attendees would like to learn or discuss during the symposium
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- Level of detail about the various risk assessment models
- Terrorist intent and how to model (red teaming, table tops, etc)
- Common definitions
- How is consequence defined?
- How are models validated? Are they validates? How can they be validated?
- Long-term impact of consequences
- Non-western perspectives of adversaries
- Preventing radicalizations
- Adversary modeling
- Economic modeling
- Serendipity
- *Black Swan* ideas
- How should the risk assessment be used to influence prevention planning
- Modeling drinking water contamination
- How is the bio-threat integrated with an all hazards model, are there lessons learned from the pandemic flu response which should be reflecting in understanding the bio-threat
- How should the risk assessment results be communicated to the general public? How does risk communication play into biosecurity?
- How does risk perception play a roll? Has anyone reviewed public concern recently? How does perception influence the technical assessment?
- How have external pressures, e.g. the current economy, altered the threat? E.g. willingness to sell an agent…
- How does remediation/decontamination play into the risk assessment?