

“Security measures and technical
solutions for major events and
expanding cities:
Enhancing public-private partnership”
Experience and development in Germany

Abu Dhabi 18–20 May 2009

Presentation by the representative of Commander-in-Chief of the Länder stand-by police forces

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Impressions of "Football in Germany"



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FIFA 2006 World Cup in Germany

2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany: Overall Review

Results/ Evaluation

Facts and Figures 1/2

- Average attendance of 51,000 at each match.
- Stadiums filled to 99.8% capacity overall.
- Total of 17.3 million national and international visitors.
- Public viewing exceeded all expectations:
 - More than 14 million spectators at all public viewing areas
 - More than 9 million spectators at public viewing areas in Berlin alone (more than 1 million at certain events).
- Total of 16,000 private security officers from 11 companies
 - 14,000 security staff underwent training in quality and security standards ahead of the event. On average, 1,370 security officers were deployed at each match.
 - Total of 100,000 items seized (800 pyrotechnic articles)

2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany: Overall Review

Results/ Evaluation


Facts and Figures 2/2

- 7,200 criminal offences, of which
 - 47% §§ 223 ff., 303, 113, 125 Criminal Code (StGB)
 - 20% property-related offences
- 862 persons injured, of which
 - 200 police officers
- approx. 9,000 persons taken into custody, of which
 - approx. 3,300 for criminal prosecution purposes
 - approx. 5,800 for threat prevention purposes
- Overall, 64 zones of restricted air space were designated; 22 violations of restricted air space were recorded (small planes)

2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany: Overall Review

Facts and Figures

Development of the hooligan data file



This chart does not include foreign data records!

During the World Cup, 8,998 foreign data records were transmitted; 27 of the persons concerned again required action by the authorities, 10 remain on file – the remaining records have been deleted.

- ■ Following coordinated nation-wide procedures, the state police forces, BKA, Federal Police and authorities for the protection of the Constitution conducted background checks on 148,351 applicants for FIFA security jobs using a standard catalogue of criteria.

- ■ Overall results:
 - 144,881 recommendations in favour
 - 2,055 recommendations against (1.38 %)
 - 1,334 applications were rejected due to incorrect information

Ticketing

Overview / total dimension:

Total availability: 3,327,504 tickets

of which sold: 3,326,747 tickets (=99.98%)



Based on the EU Council Decision of 6 December 2001, the Federal Ministry of the Interior recommended to the 2006 FIFA World Cup Organizing Committee that all tickets should be personalized.

Objectives of personalization:

- to prevent trading on the black market
- to prevent ticket fraud
- to identify fans in order to keep rival fan groups separate
- to filter out potentially violent persons based on stadium bans
- to act as a deterrent

Ticketing

Procedure:

- Complex procedure which registers the identity of every ticket buyer
- Personal data, including

Name
Date of birth
Nationality
Passport or national ID card number
Preferred national team

are recorded.



Ticketing

Procedure:

Using an **RFID chip** (Radio Frequency Identification Device), the ticket holder's identity can be checked at the stadium against the personal information registered at the time of purchase.

→ high level of protection against forgery and tampering!



Ticketing

Access control

- Approx. 2,500 random checks per match
- Each time, checks turned up approx. 50 persons holding tickets not issued in their names
- These persons were allowed entry only after presenting an identification document.
- Approx. 200-500 cases per match of persons trying to re-use tickets from a previous match -> prevented by electronic access control.



Ticketing

In conclusion:

- Complex ticketing procedure paid off
- Effective deterrent
- Germany recommends using this ticketing procedure for comparable events in the future



Video surveillance in stadiums

All stadiums are equipped with permanently mounted video cameras with panning capability.

They must be mounted so that unauthorized persons cannot gain access to them.

In addition to the organizer and stewards, the **police** must have their **own monitors** to access the system.

Video surveillance helps

- detect and prevent disruptions / threats
- secure evidence for prosecuting crimes committed in stadiums



2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany: Overall Review




Evidence and Arrest Units in Germany

Evidence and arrest units in Germany



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Structure of an evidence and arrest unit (BFE)



Equipment of an evidence and arrest unit (BFE)

manpower: 40 officers

<u>leader</u>					
<u>spotter</u>					
<u>1st group</u>					
					
<u>2nd group</u>					
					
<u>3rd group</u>					
					

For each officer:
 "Light" and "heavy" KSA*
 NBC protective gear
 Multi-purpose baton
 Pistol
 Portable radio 2m w/HSG*
 RSG* incl. holster
 Pocket torch
 Protective shield
 Bullet-proof vest
 Handcuffs
 Pocket multi-tool

BFE equipment



- 13 submachine guns
- 2 dual purpose pistol
- 3 battery chargers
- 3 portable long-range lights
- 4 binoculars
- 1 compass
- 3 weapons cleaning kit
- 1 metal detector c
- 1 night-vision device (BiV)
- 2 mountain bikes
- 1 checkpoint lighting
- 1 fire extinguisher



- 5 HFG 4 m
- 9 portable dictation machines
- 10 mountings
- 1 megaphone
- 2 radio receivers
- 2 mobile telephones
- 1 telecom terminal



- 1 photo printer
- 1 SLR camera A
- 1 SLR camera B
- 1 video recorder for BFE
- 1 video graphic printer
- 2 digital viewfinder cameras
- 1 monitor in vehicle for evidence and documentation



Kfz 21
incl. 1x4m and 1x2m
car radio



Kfz 40a/1
van for half team
incl. 1x4m and 1x2m
car radio



1st team
Kfz 44/1/n
vehicle for
evidence and
documentation
incl. 4m car radio

2nd and 3rd teams



24/n
Unmarked car
incl. 4m car radio

Vehicles of an evidence and arrest unit (BFE)



Kfz 21 Pkw



Kfz 24/n Lim



Kfz 14/2n Krad neutral



Kfz 31/n Lkw Kombi



Kfz 51a/1 le Befkw



Kfz 31 BA



Kfz 58/1 Gefkw



Kfz 44/1/n Bedokw



Kfz 40a/1 HGrukw



Kfz 40a/1 HGrukw



Kfz 40a/1 HGrukw




Kfz 40a/1 HGrukw



Kfz 40a/1 HGrukw



Kfz 40a/1 HGrukw



Technology and Tactics: Conclusions

Technology and tactics: Deployment of water cannons



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Deployment of technical command & control assets

- General considerations -

1. The **rigorous use of command and control assets** (e.g. service dogs and horses as well as heavy equipment such as water cannons and special vehicles) can significantly reduce the number of officers needed.
2. The German Police University (DHPol) should continue **monitoring the market for new (law enforcement) command & control assets, including remotely operated equipment**, and promote and assist with development in line with special and tactical needs as appropriate and as budgetary considerations permit.
3. As part of their information-sharing on operations, federal and *Länder* desk officers should **share experience** on command and control assets in use and in testing at federal and *Länder* level.

Deployment of technical command & control assets

- General considerations -

4. The use of photography and video recordings to **secure evidence and documentation** is limited by the individual's right to determine the use of his/her personal data (a basic right in Germany) and in some cases by the right of assembly.
5. **Photos or video recordings** may therefore be taken of gatherings only when there is good reason to believe that the gathering may turn violent or when there is initial suspicion of a specific crime.

To sum up: Technical command & control assets cannot replace tactical law enforcement action, but only assist it!





Technology gaps

- Due to legislation: no “seamless” video surveillance
- Public areas that have been checked/cleared are difficult to keep “clean”; surveilled
- Identification of technological gaps and suggestions for technical enhancement
- Thorough evaluation of policing operations
- Ongoing analysis of the market

Aspects of the Security Plan

Venue security: Best practices led to a pattern for administrative laws in connection with the construction of stadiums and security installations

Impact of legislation

- Rule of law
- Technical solutions have to comply with the legislation
- No change in legislation just because of new technical possibilities. There must be an identified need to improve security

Effectiveness over the short and long term

Short term:

- Technical solutions can help reduce the need for human resources
- Technical solutions can be cheaper
- Ongoing evaluation

Long term:

- Evaluation on several competent bodies
- Best practices identified in close cooperation among all existing agencies

Thank you for
your attention!