



Risk Assessment Methodology for Bioscience Facilities

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Biological Weapons Nonproliferation and Biodefense Objectives

- **Biological Weapons Nonproliferation (BWNP)**
 - An international strategy designed to prevent the acquisition, use, and spread of biological weapons
 - Improved BWNP measures reduce the *threat* of a biological weapons event
- **Biodefense**
 - A domestic strategy to improve the ability of the US to respond to bioterrorism after it has occurred
 - Improved biodefense measures reduce the *consequences* of a biological weapons event



Smallpox vaccine






Biological Facility Risk Assessment

● Biological Facility Risk

- An expression of the relationship between Threat Potential and Consequences for a particular event
 - Example Event: theft and subsequent use of biological material as a weapon
- Expert judgment contributes significantly to the analysis
- Uncertainty inherent in the process



● Threat Potential

- An estimate of the degree to which a particular adversary is willing and able to execute a particular event

● Consequences

- An estimate of the magnitude of a successfully executed event in deaths, illness, economic loss, symbolic and functional impacts



Threat Potential

- **Motive**
 - **Asset Attractiveness**
 - How well does the acquisition or sabotage of the asset achieve the adversary's objective, or lead to achieving the adversary's objective?

- **Means**
 - **Capability**
 - Does the adversary have the skills, knowledge, and tools necessary to conduct the attack/meet the objective?

- **Opportunity**
 - **Environment**
 - Is the adversary active in the area?
 - How recently have they acted in ways that may be threatening?
 - Has there been any indication of targeting?

- **Precedent**
 - Has the same agent been used as a weapon before?
 - Has the same agent been enhanced for use as a weapon before?
 - Has the same agent been stolen from a laboratory?



Asset Attractiveness


- **Biological Agents**

- **Weaponization Potential**

- Availability
- Ease of production
- Ease of handling
- Ease of packaging
- Modes of dissemination
- Stability

- **Consequences**

- Contagiousness
- Genetic engineering
- Incubation period
- Medical effects (morbidity and mortality)
- Potential to become endemic
- Economic impact



- **Security Information or Systems**


- May be targeted to facilitate gaining access to dangerous biological materials

- **Other Facility Assets**

- May be targeted by political extremists, disgruntled employees, etc.




Biological Facility Risk Insider vs. Outsider






Threat Potential Risk Mitigation Strategies





Conclusions

- **International biological weapons nonproliferation efforts reduce the threat of bioterrorism**
- **One element of a comprehensive BWNP strategy is to reduce the likelihood that dangerous pathogens and toxins could be stolen from legitimate bioscience facilities worldwide**
- **Biological facility risk assessment provides an opportunity to concentrate resources on the highest risks**
- **Biological facility risk mitigation may be accomplished through an integrated biosecurity system that incorporates policies, procedures and equipment**





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